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Security mechanisms on contemporary database systems
typically inhibit system performance. However, without
security, the database system which stores classified data
of different classifications, will pass through classified
data of different levels in order to find the properly
classified data. This 'pass through 1 inhibits performance
(i.e., reduces access precision) because unnecessary
material has been retrieved which does not aid in the
resolution of the guery. Further, the pass-through issue
also breaches the security, since the system may pass
through higher classified data for the purpose of locating
the lower classified one.
This thesis shows for the first time, our Query Modifi-
cation and Multilevel Security approach to database
security, implemented into a single database system, i.e.,
the Multi-Backend, Multi-Lingual, Multi-Model Database
System. These security mechanisms, unlike those seen on
contemporary database systems, enhance system performance
while simultaneously providing a higher degree of security
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A. AN OVERVIEW OF THE ISSUES
This thesis articulates continued research in the area
of database access control and multilevel security initiated
by Hoppenstand and Hsiao [Refs. 1,2], As addressed in
[Refs. 1,2] and characterized and identified in [Ref. 3],
the two outstanding technical issues in access control
continue to motivate research and further study.
The first issue is access precision. Access precision
is defined as the ratio of the amount of accessed data that
satisfies a user's query versus the amount of data that has
been retrieved from the secondary storage and placed in the
main memory in response to the query.
The second issue is pass-through. When classified data
with different classifications is stored in a database, it
is necessary for a contemporary database system to 'pass
through' other classified data in order to find the properly
classified data. Anytime a database system brings
classified data of different levels into the main memory
from the secondary storage, the security of the system has
been compromised.
These two issues greatly effect the efficiency and
effectiveness of a database system. The larger the amount
of data needlessly retrieved from the secondary storage in
response to a query, the smaller the access precision. If
the amount of data necessary to provide a solution to a
query was 'A* and the total amount of data retrieved was
('A' + 'B') where 'B 1 was data retrieved that made no
contribution to the solution, it can be seen that the
quotient { , A , /( ,A ' + 'B') } will yield a value less than one.
Absolute precision, a ratio of accessed data versus data
retrieved from storage equalling one, is the most desirable
level of precision and is indicative of a highly efficient
system. The pass-through problem not only breaches the
effectiveness of system security, but also incurs less than
absolute access precision.
The proposed solution to the improvement of access
precisions and elimination of pass-through issues in [Refs.
1,2] was the mathematical notion of equivalence relations
developed for database-system environments. An equivalence
relation partitions data into mutually exclusive subsets of
data. In the database environment, the equivalence
relations are identified on the basis of attribute values
and attribute-value ranges, thereby allowing the database to
be partitioned into mutually exclusive compartments of like
attribute values and value ranges. Herein lies the elegance
of the solution, these attributes which make up the
compartments are security attributes. The mutually
exclusive compartments are collections of records where each
compartment has the same aggregate of security attributes.
No two compartments have a common record with the same
aggregate of security attributes. By parsing the security
attributes of predicates of a user query, the database
system need only access the compartments which contain the
records pertaining to the query. Records not pertaining to
the query will not be passed through, thus eliminating the
pass-through problem. Normally, in conventional database
systems there has to be trade-offs between performance and
security. One way that systems try to increase performance
is by caching data retrieved by one query in hope that the
next query will probably pertain to some of the information
already retrieved in the prior query thus saving on the
retrieval time. Here security is definitely sacrificed on
behalf of performance. It is believed that high-performance
database systems do not support secure databases and
vice-versa. Hoppenstand ' s research discovered that the
concept of equivalence relations and secure compartments did
not sacrifice performance but increased it since the total
amount of data needing to be retrieved by a query was
decreased. Thus the myth that security will penalize
performance was destroyed.
B. MOTIVATION FOR MULTILEVEL SECURITY
The need of multilevel security database systems is due
to the military's security classifications. The military
normally classifies its information into one of four






and top-secret (TS) . These classes (also
called levels) are of increasing degrees of sensitivity and
require increasing authority to clear them for accesses.
Also an individual may have a certain clearance level and
still not have access to certain information classified at
that level. This is known as the need-to-know requirement.
It provides the motivation for query modification which
will be discussed in Chapter III. A multilevel-secure
system is defined by [Ref. 4] as "a system containing
information with different sensitivities that simultaneously
permits access by users with different security clearances
and needs-to-know, but prevents users from obtaining access
to information for which they lack authorization." Since
this is exactly the thought behind DoD's security
classification system (UC,C,S,TS), a database that
incorporates this concept would be appropriate for military
applications with efficiency and effectiveness.
Hoppenstand expanded his security attribute into a
multilevel structure and showed how clustering of records
into secure compartments in each classification level would,
in theory, allow an implementation of a multilevel-security
system.
C. REASONS FOR ACCESS CONTROL
The multilevel-security database discussed above was
concerned with the structure of a database that supports the
secure storage and retrieval of data with different
classification levels without breaching the security by
passing-through the different levels during retrieval and
without slowing the performance of the system. The security
clearance of the user has not been discussed at this point.
Nor has the secure access operations and controls of the
database system been discussed at this point.
There is a need for an access control mechanism for the
database system to regulate and verify accesses to the
multilevel secure database. A user may not be allowed
access to certain information within a classification for
which he has clearance. The following is an example: User
1 has a top-secret (TS) clearance for information pertaining
to military aircraft. He does not, however, have TS
clearance for information on the new B2 bomber which is also
classified TS . If a system only verifies a user's security
clearance without upholding the need-to-know requirement,
the system would probably release TS information about the
B2
,
if queried, to User 1 because he does have TS clearance.
In order for a database system to be efficient and effective
with respect to security, it must regulate and verify
accesses for each user of the system, i.e., there must be
access controls of finer granules (units) of the database
(information) within the system. Access controls are
involved in the assignment of users' rights and privileges
for the purpose of controlling access to the database on the
basis of the user's need-to-know requirement and multilevel
security clearance.
After review of current access control mechanisms, the
Query Modification [Refs. 5,6] was chosen. In the query
modification mechanism, a user's query is modified according
to user's data access rights by appending a permit clause as
a conjunction to the user's query. The 'modified' query is
then submitted to the query processor of the system as the
query to be executed. Mathematically, the system response
is the intersection of the information determined by the
original query and the information determined by the permit
clause.
The query modification mechanism is implemented in an
experimental database management system which is discussed
in the following sections.
D. CHOOSING A SYSTEM FOR EXPERIMENTING THE MULTILEVEL
SECURE DATABASES AND ITS ACCESS CONTROL MECHANISM
In order to demonstrate the notion of security
attributes, Hoppenstand chose D.K. Hsiao's Attribute-Based
Data Model [Ref. 7] (ABDM) for its characterization. There
were two reasons why ABDM was chosen. The first reason,
which is still applicable to this thesis, is that ABDM is at
the cutting edge of database technology. There is an
experimental system that has moved pass the present
conventional systems in theory and design, which employs
ABDM databases. In database research, it is more desirable
to make developments and improvements to a system that will
be involved in the future of database technology, not a
system that is to be replaced by newer technology.
The second reason for the selection was that the
security attributes and equivalence classes required for
Hoppenstand * s solution to the access control and
pass-through problem could be easily defined in ABDM's meta
data. The meta data is stored information which describes
the base data of the database. It consists primarily of a
group of tables that is maintained by the database system to
govern record clustering and to store record identifiers
(e.g., addresses). The meta-data tables form the directory
of the database and these tables are made up of attributes,
descriptors, and cluster addresses. These clusters are
groups of records such that every record in a cluster
satisfies the same set of descriptors. Therefore, these
clusters constitute the base data. This experimental
database system supports exactly Hoppenstand ' s idea of
security attribute and secure compartmentalization and was
therefore our system of choice.
E. THE SYSTEM ARCHITECTURE
Since ABDM was selected as the test data model for the
multilevel secure databases, further explanation is needed
in the area of its system architecture. The current
experimental system being used is referred to as the
Multi-Lingual, Multi-Model, Multi-Backend system and it uses
the Attribute-Based Data Language (ABDL) as its kernel
language [Ref. 8]. The system supports multiple database
languages and models, and is configured to run with multiple
backends. It is not the intention of this thesis to address
the multi-lingual or multi-model aspects of this system,
since they are not relevant to the thesis work. It is,
however the intention to examine the idea of the backend
concept which is relevant to our thesis work. The layout of
the system can be seen in Figure 1.1. Each database system
consists of zero or one (backend) controller and one or more
backends. The backend controller and the backends are
interconnected by an ethernet interconnection.
The controller serves as a communications frontend
(therefore, often referred to as the 'frontend') for the
backends as well as serving the controlling function of the
database. It normally has a tape unit which is used for
bootstrapping the controller and backend software. The tape
unit can also be used for backing up the system in
protection against system malfunction. The backends are the
"database engines" of the multiple-backend database system
[Ref. 8]. They are microprocessor-based workstations with
large amounts of storage capacity. The backend computers
are dedicated to the tasks of data storage and access. Each
backend has three disk drives, one for its evenly
distributed portion of the clustered base data, another for
the meta data which describes the base data of the database























Figure 1.1 Multi-Backend System Layout
and is replicated on every backend, and the third is for the
operating system to do paging. The system will work with
one backend; however, additional backends and their disks
improve the performance of the system. Since base data
(different clusters of files of records) is spread evenly
over the number of backends in existence, a search for and
retrieval of data for a query is done in parallel on all the
backends at once. This decreases the overall retrieval time
of the solution and thus increases performance. Actual
performance evaluations of the multi-backend system can be
found in [Ref . 9]
.
F. THE METHODOLOGY USED
This thesis implements the proposal of Hoppenstand on
the structures of multilevel security into Hsiao's
experimental Multi-Lingual, Multi-Model, Multi-Backend
system. It also incorporates a design for an effective and
efficient access control mechanism into the frontend of the
experimental database.
This will be the first time that a frontend (Query Mod)
and backend (multilevel security attributes) approach to
database security has been implemented into a single
database system. We believe this system will now
demonstrate not only high performance with multilevel
security but also more effectiveness within access control
and security compartmentalization. In other words,
efficiency and effectiveness can be achieved in a multilevel
10
database system if our compartmentalization technique and
query modification method are employed in database
organization and access control, respectively.
G. SUPPORTING WORK
Characterization and identification of the pass-through
and access precision problems is due to D.K. Hsiao [Ref. 3]
who also outlined the security atom concept which was the
fundamental basis of the security methodology outlined in
Hoppenstand • s paper [Ref. 1] and therefore continued
throughout this thesis.
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II. GENERAL DESCRIPTION OF ABDM & MBDS
As discussed in the Introduction of this thesis, the
Attribute-Based Data Model (ABDM) was chosen to demonstrate
the notion of security attributes and to implement the
access control mechanism. In order to better understand
ABDM structure and support further discussion in later
chapters of this thesis, this model is now discussed in
detail
.
A. THE BASE DATA
ABDM characterizes two kinds of data: the base data and
the meta data. The base data is what is normally thought of
when discussing the data within a traditional database.
Basically, it is information that is stored, in order to be
retrieved and used at a later time. Specifically in ABDM,
it is a collection of files of records. Each record is
composed of a collection of attribute-value pairs and
textual information. The attribute-value pair is sometimes
referred to as a keyword and the textual information
referred to as the record body.
The attribute-value pair is a member of the Cartesian
product of the attribute set and the value domain of the
attribute. A record contains at most one attribute-value
pair for each attribute defined in the database, i.e., no
12
two attributes are identical within an individual record.
An example of a record is shown below.
(<TEMP , Aircraftlnfo> , <RADIUS , 12 0> , <PLANE , Fighter>
,
<COUNTRY,USA>, (Carrier Ops Certified})
The angle brackets, <,>, enclose an attribute-value pair.
The curly brackets, {,}, include the record body. The
entire record is enclosed in parentheses, (,). It should be
noted that the first attribute-value pair of all records of
a file is the same. The attribute is TEMP and its value is
the file name. The above example therefore has the file
name of Aircraftlnfo.
All constructs of the ABDM relating to the base data are
well defined in terms of other constructs with two
exceptions. The two undefined constructs are the attribute
set and the value domain.
There are certain attribute-value pairs of a record that
are called the directory keywords of the record. They are
referred to by this name because either the attribute-value
pairs or their attribute-value ranges are kept in a
directory for identifying the records. Consequently, those
attribute-value pairs which are not kept in the directory
are called non-directory keywords. The records of the files
of a database constitute the base data of the database. In
general, given a record of attribute-value pairs, one cannot
13
keywords unless one refers to the meta data which is to be
discussed in the next section.
B. THE META DATA
The meta data is defined as stored information about the
base data. It is the various meta-data constructs that form
the directory of the database, referred to in the previous
section. The constructs of the directory are: attributes,
descriptors, and clusters. Collectively, they contain all
information needed to support the database interaction with
the base data.
An attribute is used to represent a category or certain
common property of the base data. Using the Aircraftlnfo
file example from the previous section, RADIUS is an
attribute that corresponds to actual aircraft radius
features in the database. A descriptor is used to describe
a range of values or a unigue value that an attribute may
have. For example (1001 <= RADIUS <= 1200) is a possible
descriptor for the attribute RADIUS. The descriptors that
are defined for an attribute are mutually exclusive in terms
of their values, i.e., you would not see the following two
descriptors within the same meta data:
(1001 <= RADIUS <= 1200) and (750 <= RADIUS <= 1100).
The reason is, an aircraft with a radius of 1050 for
example, would fall into both descriptors ofthe attribute
RADIUS and therefore mutual exclusivity would not hold. It
should be noted that there are no restrictions as to the
14
should be noted that there are no restrictions as to the
number of descriptors for an attribute within a database
only that the descriptors be mutually exclusive in terms of
their values. Mathematically, the descriptors of the
attribute serve to derive equivalence classes which
effectively partition the database into mutually exclusive
sets of records. These record sets are referred to as
clusters and will be discussed next.
Probably the single most important construct in the meta
data is the cluster. Although the other constructs are
important in that they allow the notion of a cluster to be
defined, it is the concept of the cluster that the entire
system is built around. It will be seen in follow-on
chapters how the cluster supports the design and
implementation of multi-level security and the access
control mechanism. A cluster is a group of records such
that every record in the cluster satisfies the same set of
descriptors. Looking at the attribute RADIUS again, all
records with RADIUS between 1001 and 1200 may form one
cluster whose descriptor is (1001 <= RADIUS <= 1200). In
this case, the cluster satisfies the set of a single
descriptor. In a typical ABDM database, a cluster tends to
satisfy a set of multiple descriptors.
An important characteristic of the cluster is the
non-uniformity of its size. It would not be logical to
pre-define the size of a cluster, in that its size is
15
dynamic with respect to the amount of data within the
database that satisfies the descriptor set of that cluster.
Some clusters may have hundreds or thousands of records;
other clusters may have only a few; while still others may
not have any records at all.
ABDM requires some means of effectively keeping track of
the meta data constructs. To fulfill this requirement,
three tables are maintained and it is these tables that form
the directory mentioned in the beginning of this section.




(DDIT) and the cluster-definition table (CDT) , examples of
which can be seen in Figure 2.1.
The attribute table is used to keep track of the
attributes for which descriptors are formed; more
specifically, the attribute table maps directory attributes
to the descriptors defined on them. Observe Figure 2.1. a,
AT here contains only three attributes (i.e., Radius, Plane,
Temp) , this is for illustration purposes only, the typical
database would have considerably more attributes.
The descriptor-to-descriptor-id table is used to keep
track of all the descriptor sets that effectively partition
the database into clusters; more specifically, DDIT maps
each descriptor to a unique descriptor id. There are three
types of descriptors available within DDIT. They are
referred to as: Type-A, Type-B, and Type-C descriptors. A
16
Attribute Attribute Type DDIT Entry
RADIUS A D1 1
PLANE C D2I
TEMP B D31
(a) An Attribute Table (AT).
Id Descriptor




D21 PLANE = Fighter
D22 PLANE = Bomber
D23 PLANE = Recon
D31 TEMP = US A
D32 TEMP = USSR
(b) A Descriptor -to -Descriptor -Id Table (DDIT)
Id Desc-ld Set Record-Id
CI {Oil ,D21,D31 } R1,R2,R3,R4
C2 {011,021,032} R5,R6
C3 {012,021,031 } R7,R8,R9







CI 1 {D14,D23,D31 } R26
C12 {D14,D23,D32} R27,R28
(c) A Cluster -Definition Table (CDT).
Figure 2.1 The Directory Tables
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type-A descriptor is a conjunction of a less-than-or-equal-
to predicate and a greater-than-or-equal-to predicate. The
following is an example of a type-A descriptor: ( (RADIUS >
1001) and (RADIUS < 1200)). Note that the same attribute
(in this case RADIUS) must appear in both predicates. A
type-B descriptor consists of an equality predicate. An
example of this is (TEMP = USA) . The type-C descriptor
consists of the name of an attribute only. The type-C
attribute defines a set of type-C sub-descriptors. These
are equality predicates defined over all unique attribute
values which exist in the database. This then allows by
definition the type-C sub-descriptor to also be of type-B.
Although a type-C descriptor is also of type-B, unlike
type-B, type-C descriptors are on-demand descriptors, i.e.,
if for a type-C attribute, a type-C sub-descriptor for a
particular value (this new value could have either been
inserted by the user during an update operation or in a
record generation session) is not available in DDIT, a new
type-C sub-descriptor is automatically generated and
inserted into DDIT. An example of the type-C sub-descriptor
is as follows: the type-C attribute PLANE forms the type-C





= Recon) where "Fighter," "Bomber" and "Recon" are the only
unique database value of the PLANE attribute in the base
data. Finally, observe that as additional descriptors (no
matter what the type) for the same attribute are introduced,
18
one of the partitions within DDIT is further divided into
two. It can now be observed that for a given attribute, the
number of resulting partitions is proportional to the number
of descriptors introduced.
The cluster-definition table is used to keep track of
which records belong to which clusters; more specifically,
CDT maps descriptor-id sets to cluster ids and cluster ids
to record ids. An example of CDT can be seen in Figure
2. I.e. Each entry in CDT consists of a unigue cluster id,
e.g., CI, C2 , C3 , ..., a set of descriptor ids whose
descriptors define the cluster, and ids of the records that
are in the cluster. The record ids within the cluster will
actually correspond to the address locations where the
records will reside on the base data disk. CDT only keeps
track of those clusters that contain records. If new
records are entered into the database that reguire clusters
not currently defined within CDT, then at that time new
clusters are formed and entered into CDT. As the number of
descriptors which characterizes the clusters increases, the
sizes of the clusters decrease. Individually, each of them
is smaller than a typical database. Within a database, it
can therefore be seen why a more general descriptor is less
desirable than a specific one. There will be less records
to retrieve for a particular Descriptor-Id set since on the
average it should be smaller. For example referring to
Figure 2.1.b, if there was a single descriptor (0 <= RADIUS
19
<= 1000) instead of Dll and D12 , there would be less
clusters and more records within the remaining clusters.
For example CI and C2 would merge into one cluster with
seven records instead of two clusters with four and three
records, respectively.
C. THE ATTRIBUTE-BASED DATA LANGUAGE (ABDL)
When examining the Attribute-Based Data Model (ABDM)
,
its native (kernal) language, the attribute-based data
language (ABDL) , should also be included in the examination.
ABDL supports the system's five primary database operations:
INSERT, DELETE, UPDATE, RETRIEVE, and RETRIEVE-COMMON.
Individually, each operation is considered a request
Collective, two or more requests together form a
transaction. Except for the actual database creation and
control operations which are carried out by menu-driven
language not in the same style of the rest of the data
language, these five operations can provide the user with
all the necessary requests and transactions for the
manipulation of a typical database. It should be noted here
that the database creation as well as the exercising of
access control over the database is a task of the database
administrator. This idea will be expanded upon in Chapter
III, i.e., the access control chapter.
In order to promote a "feel" for the language, not a
detailed understanding of its formal specifications, each of
the operations will be illustrated with a simple example.
20
The INSERT request is used to insert a new record into
an existing database. Each request in ABDL has along with
an operation a qualification. This qualification is used to
specify the part of the database that is to be operated
upon. Within the INSERT operation, the qualification is a
list of attribute-value pairs and a record body being
inserted. The following is an example of an INSERT
operation:
INSERT (<TEMP, Aircraftlnfo> , <RADIUS , 1200> , <PLANE , Fighter>
,
<Country,USA>, {Carrier Ops Certified})
The operation will insert a record into the Aircraftlnfo
database file that has the characteristics of it being a
fighter aircraft of the US with the radius of 1200. Note
the fact that this aircraft is carrier-ops-certified has no
baring on the record's characteristics since this
information is in the record body and not found in the
attribute-value pairs.
An UPDATE request is used to modify records of a
database. Its qualification consists of the query and the
modifier. The query specifies which records of the database
are to be modified, the modifier specifies how the records
being modified are to be updated. The following is an
example of the UPDATE operation:
21
UPDATE (TEMP = Aircraftlnf o) (PLANE = Fighter) (COUNTRY =
USA) (RADIUS = RADIUS + 500)
This operation will increase each US fighter aircraft's
radius by 500. Here the query is (TEMP = Aircraftlnfo) and
the modifier is (RADIUS = RADIUS + 500)
.
The RETRIEVE operation does as its name implies, it is
used to retrieve records of a database. The qualification
of the RETRIEVE request includes a query, and an optional
target-list and by-clause. The query specifies which
records are to be retrieved, the target-list consists of a
list of attributes whose attributes values the user desires
to be output and the by-clause may be used to group records.
The following is an example of the RETRIEVE operation
without the optional by-clause:
RETRIEVE ((TEMP = Aircraftlnfo) and (RADIUS > 1500))
(PLANE)
This operation will produce to the user the plane names of
all the records in the Aircraftlnfo database file with a
radius of greater than 1500. Here the (TEMP = Aircraftlnfo)
and (RADIUS > 1500) form the query and (PLANE) is the target
list.
22
The DELETE operation is used to remove one or more
records from a database. Its qualification is a query. The
followinq is an example of the DELETE operation:
DELETE ((TEMP = Aircraftlnfo) and (RADIUS > 1500))
This operation similar to the RETRIEVE format, will delete
from the Aircraftlnfo database file all records whose
aircraft have a radius of greater than 1500. Here, the
query is simply (TEMP = Aircraftlnfo) and (RADIUS > 1500)
.
The last of the five operations is perhaps the most
complicated, the RETRIEVE-COMMON request is used to merge
two files by common attribute values. It is a transaction
of two retrieve operations with a common clause in between.
The following is an example of the RETRIEVE-COMMON
operation.
RETRIEVE ((TEMP = NavalAircraft ) and (RADIUS > 1500))
(PLANE)
COMMON (RADIUS, RADIUS)
RETRIEVE ( (TEMP = MarineAircraft) and
(RADIUS > 1500)) (PLANE)
This operation will find all records in the naval aircraft
database file with aircraft radius greater than 1500, find
all records in the marine aircraft database file with
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aircraft radius greater than 1500, identify records from
respective files with radii in common, and return the
records of planes with the same radius figures. It should
be noted that the common attributes and the target lists
need not have identical names, although they are identical
in this example.
As a final thought with respect to ABDL, this language
supports other data languages which are translated into it.
This helps provide the multi-lingual portion of the
Multi-Backend, Multi-Model, Multi-Lingual Database System
[Ref. 8]. As mentioned previously, ABDM and ABDL will not
be further discussed in our thesis, although their
introduction should be helpful in understanding the overall
system composition.
D. AN OVERVIEW OF THE MULTI-BACKEND DATABASE SYSTEM
The Multi-backend database system (MBDS) is the hardware
which supports ABDM discussed in the previous section. That
is, the attribute-based data language (ABDL) of ABDM is the
kernel language used in MBDS. As mentioned in the thesis
introduction, MBDS consists of one or more backends and
their disk subsystems which are configured in a parallel
fashion and are regulated by a controller computer. It is
important to note that in this hardware configuration, MBDS
separates the controller hardware from the backend hardware.
This allows the system not only to be beneficial for
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pedagogical purposes but supports database growth and
performance improvements.
1. The Backends
Parallel architecture is a key feature of MBDS and
is what is instrumental in the performance improvement of
the system. Multi-backends means several backends used at
the same time, i.e., in parallel. They are dedicated to the
tasks of data storage and access. Each backend maintains a
copy of the meta data and the distinct clustered data
assigned to it. In general, since there is a finite amount
of data within a database at the time of any transaction,
the complete search of the database would take X amount of
time. Suppose the data was distributed evenly across
several database systems and searched at the same time,
i.e., each system search its portion of data at the same
time. Since each system would contain less data than the
original database system did, it is obvious to see that it
would take less time to search the entire amount of data.
This is the idea behind the multiple-backend system.
Instead of individual systems containing portions of the
entire base data, one system employing several backends is
used. The records of a given cluster are evenly distributed
over backends so that the search time of all backends
running in parallel is proportionally less than one backend
searching all the records of the cluster by itself. The
25
controller computer coordinates the communication of
transactions and will be discussed next.
2 . The Frontend
The controller computer does not contain any of the
clustered data itself. Its function is to control the
database system and communicate with the backends and the
users. It should be noted that the access control
mechanism, to be discussed in Chapter III, is also located
in the frontend. By using a broadcast bus (presently an
ethernet with special modification) , the controller is able
to simultaneously send a message to all the each backends.
The message can be typical database transactions to be
executed by the backends. The backends can then execute the
transactions in a parallel fashion. It is interesting to
note that if multiple transactions are sent across the bus
to each backend by the controller, the backends have the
ability to gueue the transactions and handle them in order
without re-transmission by the controller. The term
communications frontend or just frontend is used to refer to
the controller because of this type of communications
coordination.
E. FRONTEND VS. BACKEND
The previous sections of this chapter discussed the
Multi-Backend database system architecture. This
explanation provided the background reguired to understand
the design alternatives discussed in this section.
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Specifically, the terms discussed previously to be
considered in this section are frontend and backend.
The access control and multi-level security design
decisions with respect to system architecture considered by
this thesis is primarily that of frontend-versus-backend.
In other words, should the access control and multi-level
security mechanisms reside in the frontend, or backend?
Intuitively, based on the parallelism provided by the
backends, it would seem most advantageous in terms of
efficiency, to place as much work as possible in the
backends. This would result in the processing being
distributed over the backends thus achieving the maximum
benefit from the parallelism. The result of placing too
many requirements in the frontend would be creating the
potential of a bottleneck in the system. A bottleneck in
the frontend would result in the backends being idle while
the frontend was busy. Obviously, this situation should be
avoided since it reduces the efficiency gains produced from
the parallelism of the system.
The previous paragraph presents a pretty strong argument
for placing access control and multi-level security
mechanisms in the backends. However, as will be shown in
the remainder of this chapter, the functionality of the
mechanisms make it worth while considering both the frontend
and backend when making design decisions.
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We now will discuss the design decision concerning where
the access control mechanism is to reside in the Multi-
Model, Multi-Lingual, Multi-Backend Database System.
Various alternatives will be discussed that consider both
frontend and backend possibilities. Chapter III will
discuss the actual design and implementation of the access
control mechanism itself.
Access control, as discussed in Section A of this
chapter, involves the assignment of user privileges.
Therefore access control can be considered in two parts:
the storage of the user privileges, and the algorithm to
utilize and implement these user privileges. Though both of
these parts will reside in either the frontend or backend,
both need to be incorporated in the decision process of
frontend versus backend.
The first issue to be discussed is the storage of user
privileges. If the backend method is to be considered, then
this user privilege data will have to reside in each of the
backends meta data disks. Hsiao and Menon suggest several
design alternatives in this regard. One of these designs
will be illustrated to provide a general understanding of
how this would be accomplished, and to point out the
benefits and drawbacks to such a design.
The example provided here is typical of a backend design
in that it requires modification to the meta data
structures, i.e., AT, DDIT, and CDT. Figure 2.2 uses the
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same meta data tables introduced in Section A, an shows
these modifications made to DDIT and CDT.
Id Descriptor USER-1 USER-2
D11 0<RADIUS< 600 — no insert
D12 601<RADIUS<1000 — no i nser t
D13 1001<RADIUS<1200 — no update, no delete
D14 1201<RADIUS — al 1
D21 PLANE = Fighter — no update, no delete
D22 PLANE = Bomber — all
D23 PLANE = Recon — al 1
D31 TEMP = U S A — —
D32 TEMP rUSSR — al 1
Figure 2.2 A Descriptor-to-Descriptor-Id Table (DDIT)
Here, DDIT is augmented with two columns. Each column
articulates the access privileges for one user. Using the
notation suggested by Hsiao and Menon, a '-' indicates that
no operation is disallowed for that descriptor for that
particular user. An 'ALL' indicates just the opposite, all
operations are allowed for that descriptor for that user.
CDT formed from this augmented DDIT can come in two forms, a
single large CDT, with privilege columns for each user, as
shown in Figure 2.1.C
,
or a separate CDT formed for each
user that specifies only those clusters authorized for that
user along with that user's privileges for that cluster, as
shown in Figure 2.3.
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Id Desc-ld Set Record-Id
CI {D 1 1 ,D21 fD31 > R1,R2,R3,R4 no update, no delete, no insert
C3 {D12.D21,D31 } R7,R8,Rg no insert, no update, no delete
Figure 2.3 A Cluster-Definition Table (CDT)
It is not the purpose of this section to present a full
understanding of how this particular design functions. What
should be noted from this example is these meta data tables
function as they did prior to modification. That is, they
continue to provide the absolute access precision, but now
also articulate access control. This design provides a
complete method for access control. Furthermore, because it
incorporates these mechanisms in the backends, it makes use
of the systems parallel architecture. However, this design
has several other aspects which must be considered. This
design exists at the expense of the secondary storage. This
in and of itself is not a criterion for ruling out this
design because the secondary storage is inexpensive in terms
of cost and can easily be expanded. However, especially
when considering a separate CDT for each user, if the number
of users and the amount of data is high, this method
maybecome prohibitive. This potential problem is compounded
by the fact that the multi-level security design and
implementation, discussed in Chapter IV, uses separate CDT's
for each security level, the amount of meta data might
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become excessively large. Another potential drawback to
this design occurs when considering updates to a user's
privilege. Updating a user's privilege involves the
restructuring of the meta data tables (DDIT and CDT) for
that user. This could be expensive if the update requires
extensive restructuring, and during this restructuring
process no other queries can be processed. This problem is
exacerbated by the fact that the meta data exists at each
backend.
These problems with the backend approach to access
controls leads us to look for an alternative solution, which
is the frontend approach. Chapter III discusses the design
and implementation of the frontend approach for access
control, but its immediate advantages over the backend
approach will be discussed here.
First of all, it must be pointed out that the
frontend/controller handles the query before it is
broadcasted to the backends. The frontend method for access
control modifies the query before this broadcasting occurs.
This process is called Query Mod, and is described in detail
in Chapter III. This frontend method has the immediate
advantage of determining the validity of the query, i.e., if
the query is requesting data not authorized for that user.
The savings of the frontend over the backend method is that
the latter will not determine query validity until after the
query has been broadcasted, and processed at each backend.
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Obviously, it would be beneficial to determine query
validity at the frontend. This requires that the user
privileqe data and the access control algorithm be located
in the frontend. The advantage of placing the user
privilege in the frontend is that modification to this data
is effected more efficiently than in the case of the
backend. This is because this data is centrally maintained
and therefore more easily updated. The drawback to this
method is that it is not able to take advantage of the
parallelism offered by the system. However, provided that
the Query Mod method is efficient, the gains achieved via
the advantages mentioned above, would be expected to more
than outweigh this disadvantage.
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III. ACCESS CONTROL
Access control in the context used in this thesis refers
to controlling what accesses a user can effect once that
user has gained access to the system. Therefore, it is
assumed that adeguate operating system security measures are
in effect to prohibit unauthorized entry into the system.
Separate access control mechanisms for the database system
will handle an authorized entry and utilization of the
database. It is the security mechanisms for the database
that are discussed here.
As stated in Section D.2 of Chapter II, the access
control mechanism discussed in this chapter resides in the
frontend. Access control will be separated into two
distinct but related areas: guery modification and user
profile specification. User profile specification is
discussed first.
A. THE USER PROFILE SPECIFICATION
1. The Need of the Database Administrator (DBA)
The purpose of user profile specification is to
allow the access privileges of a particular user to be
specified, stored and maintained. Obviously these access
privileges need to be monitored and dictated by some
trusted, benevolent authority. This authority will be
called the Database Administrator or simply DBA. It will be
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DBA's responsibility to ensure that every user has a
profile. A user's profile will be the statement of access
privileges for that user. DBA alone (excluding trusted
system processes) must have access to each user's profile
for the purpose of modification of that user's access
privileges.
Each user profile will need to contain specific
information that will be utilized by the query modification
routine which will be discussed later.
First, each user will need to have a user profile.
If a person tries to logon to the database system and no
user profile exists for that user, the entry into the system
will not be granted. Furthermore, a password must be
supplied by the user for authentication purposes.
Therefore, both the user name and that user's corresponding
password will need to be maintained in the user profile.
2 . Two Approaches to the Specifications
Following the specification of user name and
password, the next logical step is to specify which
databases a given user has access to. There are two
possible approaches to this issue. The first method would
be to specify those databases to which the user is not
allowed any access. The second method is to specify only
those databases to which the user is allowed some access.
Both methods would properly maintain access control based on
a need-to-know criterion; however, the second method,
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stating which databases the user is allowed access, is the
method of choice. This is because the number of databases
to which a user is allowed any access is likely to be small
compared to the total number of databases in the system.
This would be particularly true in a system that contains a
large number of databases. The benefit of selecting this
method also becomes apparent in its utilization. Because of
this method, an access to a database must be explicitly
stated in a user profile. When a user requests to access a
specific database, an exact match based on that database
name must be found in that user's profile. If that match is
not found, no access will be granted. When an access to a
database is requested, only half of the list in the user
profile containing valid databases would have to be searched
on the average. If the other method were used, stating only
those databases to which no access is allowed, would require
searching the entire list every time an access to a database
was requested. Not only is this method less efficient, it
is also less secure because it does not require an exact
match for it to succeed. For example, an access to a
misspelled database name would succeed at this initial step,
therefore, requiring more error checking. For these
reasons, it is decided to state in the user profile only
those databases to which the user is allowed some access.
For access control to be realistic and complete, it
must be able to specify different access privileges for each
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database to which has been allowed an access. Therefore,
the user profile must be able to specify access privileges
for each database. These access privileges are discussed in
the following paragraphs.
3 . Specifying Operations and Data for Individual
Databases
Access privileges on a given database are based on
what operations that can be performed on that database. All
database operations can be placed in four basic categories:
Retrieve, Insert, Update, and Delete. Therefore, a user
profile will need to specify database access privileges
based on these operations. This means that it must be
specified in the user profile if that user can perform some,
any, or all of these operations.
However, this matter is slightly more complicated
when more than one but less than all operations are to be
authorized. This concerns the inferences that can be made
from the allowed operations. For example, the retrieve,
insert and delete operations have been authorized and the
update operation has been not been authorized. In this
case, the fact that the update operation has not been
authorized can be subverted simply by a combination of
deletions and insertions. Therefore, an algorithm must be
implemented to assist DBA to safeguard against such unwanted
inferences when a user profile is created or modified.
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4.
Specifying Finer Classifications and Granules of
Data for Protections
This method of limiting operations available to the
user can be extended to further articulate the access
privileges of a user. Once the use of a particular database
operation (retrieve, insert, etc.) has been granted, it must
also be possible to restrict an access to data based on
their attribute names or attribute values, or both. This
would include restricting a user's access to data based on
the security classification of the data requested
(unclassified, confidential, secret, top secret), and/or
data value ranges, i.e., restricting a user accessing data
within certain value ranges. The user profile would need to
specify access privileges using these methods for each
attribute of each database specified in a user's profile.
5 The Detailed Design of User-Profile Specifications
The need and use of a user profile has been
discussed in the high-level design discussion of the
previous sections. It has been also stated what the user
profile should contain. This section discusses the detailed
design of the user profile. This design discusses the data
structures that contain the user profile, and also the
operations that can be performed on the user profile by DBA.
The user profile is stored in a file format. When a
user initiates a session with the database, that the user's
profile is read from the file format into a linked list
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structure. The file format is introduced in Figure 3.1 to
aid in explanation.
As can be seen in this figure, all the information
necessary to specify a user access as required by the
high-level design has been supported.
When a potential user requests an entry into the
database system, that user's corresponding user profile is
consulted for authentication purposes. If it is a valid
user, that user profile is read into a linked list
structure. This linked list structure is maintained in the
memory until the user exits the system. This user-profile
linked list is utilized by the query modification mechanism
to be discussed later. The linked list structure is
illustrated in Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.3.
As stated earlier, DBA has the responsibility and
authority to perform operations on user profiles. These
operations involve creating, modifying, and deleting user
profiles. These operations are effected by DBA's own user
profile utilizing the same linked-list data structures
described in Figure 3.3. These data structures are used to
assist in making corrections and modifications easier and
more efficient.
When creating a new user profile, the memory is
created for the user profile linked list. (See Figure 3.3
again.) DBA is queried for input, and these values are































/*name of data base user allowed to access
/* name of a template in Databasename 1
/* what operations usor can porform
/* on Templatename 1 . Tor'y' specifies
/* operation is allowed, else not allowed
Estates security level for each operation
/*security ranges: - unclassified
/* 1 - confidential
/* 2 - secret
/* 3 - top secret
/*a attribute in Templatename 1
/*format operator,relational operator,range
/specifies allowable data ranges for that
/* operation
9999




















/* end of Templatename 1 */




/* end of Databasename 1





/* marks end of database
/* two '$' marks end of user profile
















char insrt[lngth+ 1 ].;
char updt[lngth+ 1 ];
char deltjlngth 1+1 1;
struct attributes *nxtattrr;
/database name in usr prfl
/*pnts to allowable templtes
/*pnts to next database in
/user profile
/template name in database
/*pnts attributes in database
/*pts to next template in db
/attribute name in template
/* contains operation info.
/* It can contain template,
/* security, or attribute
/* info,













Figure 3-2 User Profile Linked-List Coding Structure
opportunity to check and modify this data prior to its being
written to the user-profile file.
A similar method to creating a new user profile is
used to modify an existing user profile. DBA specifies
which user profile is to be modified. The file
corresponding to the user name and user identification
number is read into the user profile linked-list structure.
Modifications are then easily made by replacing data values
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TempNaiiie 22 r-» Secur- i ty r-» R t tr i bu teName
Retrieve y/n Retrieve 0-3 Retrieve (ranqe)
Insert y/n Insert 0-3 Insert (ranqe)
Update y/n Update 0-3 Update (ranqe)
Delete y/n Delete 0-3 Delete (range)
NextRttributePtr NextRttributePtr NextRttributePtr
Figure 3.3 User Profile Linked-List Data Structure
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The key point of this user profile mechanism is that
only DBA and his/her trusted system processes can have
access to the user-profile files. No user is able to modify
his/her own, or any other user's profile.
B. QUERY MODIFICATION
1 . The High-Level Design of Query Modification
The method to utilize the user-profile information
is called Query Modification, or, simply, Query Mod. The
methodology is straightforward. The Query-Mod routine will
accept a query from a user request and modify the request
based on that user's profile information. This method
involves adding to the existing request attribute value
pairs obtained from the user profile that belongs to the
user making the request. Attribute-value pairs have been
discussed in Chapter II. This can have the effect of
further specifying the data to be accessed if the added
attributes are key attributes. This is because the
Query-Mod mechanism forces certain attribute-value pairs to
be present in the (modified) request. These newly inserted
attribute-value pairs force the request to be more specific
as to the desired data. As a result, it will be likely that
fewer clusters of records will have to retrieved.
Therefore, Query Mod makes the execution of the request more
efficient, i.e., increasing the access precision. This is
because Query Mod is done prior to any actual data
retrieval. As a result less unwanted data will be brought
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into the memory that would need to be passed through once
the data has been retrieved. The benefit of Query Mod with
respect to security can clearly be seen here. Because Query
Mod is done prior to data retrieval, data which the user is
not authorized to access is never brought into the main
memory. This is because due to Query Mod, the clusters
containing unauthorized data with respect to the user are
never considered for retrieval. It must be noted that this
is true if all attributes used from the user profile are key
attributes. Because the attributes in AT, DDIT, and CDT are
exclusively key attributes, only those predicates in the
user profile that contain key attributes will effect access
precision. Predicates containing non-key key attributes in
the user profile, while not improving access precision, do
produce finer granularity in the end product for the user.
It is the information contained in the user profile that
determines what is authorized or unauthorized for that user.
2 . The Detailed Design of Query Modification
A query is brought into the Query Mod mechanism in
the form of a two dimensional array called a Request Table,
or Reqtbl . The bounds of the array are specified at system
boot-up by the specification of the maximum number of
attributes and templates allowable per database. The query
is parsed for syntactic correctness prior to being passed
onto Query Mod.
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Two primary data structures are utilized in Query
Mod. The first is the user profile in its linked-list
format in Figure 3.3. The second data structure is Reqtbl
which as mentioned earlier is the two dimensional array that
contains the query. Reqtbl format is illustrated in Figure
3.4.
Prior to entering the Query Mod mechanism, a user
access to the system and to the particular database must be
commenced. This is accomplished by first requiring the user
to enter his/her name and password. These items are checked
against the user's profile for access validation. If this
access is valid, than the user's profile is read into the
linked-list structure specified in Figure 3.3. The user is
then required to enter the name of the database from which
queries are made. This database name is checked against all
the database names in the user profile (now in linked-list
form) . If a match is not found, the user is notified that
he/she is not authorized to access this particular database.
If a match is found, then pointers are set to mark the
beginning and end of the user profile data that refers to
this particular database. These pointers are used by both
the query parser as well as the Query Mod mechanism. How
the Query Mod mechanism utilizes this information is




















/* beginning of query marker
/* traffic ident. number
/* request number
/* route type
/* above not necessary for Query Mod
/* request type i.e. insert, delete etc.
/* Number of predicates, predicate = attrib. name
/* followed by relational operator followed by value
/* TEMP"
/*•='
/* Name of template with requested database
/* 'SECURITY'
/* relational operator, usually <=
/* security value: 0-unclass, l-confid,2-secret
/* 3-top secret
/* zero or more query predicates.
/* '$' marks end of predicates
/* "*' marks beginning of target list, target
/* list is where user states what values he/she
/* wants to see as a result of the query
/* tgt name = attribute name
/* can have zero or more targets, list of target
/*names terminated by a '*'
/* sort field attribute. User can state if the
/* response to the query is to be sorted based
/* on attribute, must be one of the target list.
/* attribute names





























Figure 3.4 User Profile Request Table (Reqtbl) Format
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3 . An Algorithm for Query Modification of the Insert
Operation
It is first determined what type of request the
query is (i.e., insert, delete, retrieve, etc.). This is
determined by examining Reqtbl[4]. An insert request is
processed in a slightly different manner, because it does
not require a relational operator for its predicates. The
case of an insert request is examined in this section.
The format for an insert Reqtbl is illustrated in
Figure 3.5. (Note that no relational operators are needed
within the attribute-value pairs)
.
The Query Mod algorithm for an insert request is as
follows:
1. For the first step of the insert, Query Mod is to
verify that the attribute name, TEMP in Reqtbl
(Reqtbl [7] has a matching attribute name, TEMP, in the
user profile.
2. The next step is to verify that this user is
authorized to perform an insert operation on this
template, therefore, the file. This is done by
checking the list of operations following the template
name. A 'Y 1 or 'y' must exist next to the operation,
insert, for this request to be valid.
3
.
The query is then checked to make sure that the
security level has been included (i.e., in Reqtbl [8]
and [9]). The security attribute is always included
in both the request and the user profile if they have
been generated by the database software. However, if
they are created manually (i.e., via an editor), the
user may have failed to include these attributes. If
a security attribute does not exist in either the
request or the user profile, the request is
disallowed. This is because the security attribute
value must be specified either by the user for the
request or by DBA for the user profile. It is not
possible to decide upon a default security value in
either of these cases in order to allow the query to
















/* beginning of request
/* traffic unit number
/* request number
/* route type
/* request type; insert = 4
/* number of attributes
/* required
/* name of template within database
/* required
/* security level value 0, 1,2,3

























/* end of attribute value pairs
/* end of request
*/
*/
Figure 35 Insert Reqtbl Format
there is an exception in a retrieve-type request where
the lowest security level is also the default security
level for the user profile and request.
After the security attribute names have been verified,
their values are checked to ensure that the security
level in the request (i.e., Reqtbl [9]) is less than or
equal to the security level in the user profile. If
this comparison fails, the request is disallowed.
The final step is to check the remaininq items in the
request (i.e., Reqtbl[10]—End of Query). These are
the attribute-value pairs to be inserted into the
database. It must be verified that the values fall
within the insert ranges specified in the user
profile. This is effected by reading the information
from the user-profile linked list that pertains to
allowable insert ranges into a separate, working
linked list. Each attribute name in the request is
compared against this list to find a match on a
user-profile-specified attribute name. If a match is
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not found, the request is discontinued because the
attribute name in the request does not exist in the
database's template. Once a match is found, it is
verified that the request values fall within the range
specified in the user profile for that attribute. If
a requested insert value falls outside a specified
range, the request is discontinued.
As can be seen, the Query Mod mechanism for an
insert type request does not necessitate actual modification
to the query. The Query Mod mechanism simply acts as a
'security parser' by verifying that the requested operations
and the values to be inserted are authorized. No
modification to the request is necessary because as stated
earlier in step three, no default value is utilized.
Instead, proper values are set in the user profile that will
ensure proper security and data integrity. However, the
other types of requests: retrieve, update, delete, and
retrieve-common, can actually be modified or appended to
ensure their compliance to the security requirements
specified in the user profile.
4 . An Algorithm for Query Modification of Non-Insert
Operations
a. A General Discussion
As discussed earlier, the modification algorithm
for an insert-type request differs from the non-insert-type
requests. The difference between the two can be shown by
comparing the respective Reqtbl for inert and non-insert
types. The non-insert type of requests requires relational
operators in their predicates whereas the insert type of
requests does not. The algorithm for the insert request
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simply verified that the insert operation is allowed for the
requested attributes and that their corresponding values are
within the allowable ranges permitted by the user profile.
The algorithm for the non-insert request needs more
extensive processing and verification; however, the data
structures (i.e., Reqtbl and the user profile) remain
essentially the same except where explicitly shown.
Unlike the Query Mod algorithm for the insert
type of requests, the algorithm for a non-insert request
will involve actual modification to the query. The modified
query is the result of predicates being appended to the
request. The non-insert requests are retrieve, update,
delete, and retrieve-common. These newly appended
predicates come from the user profile. The result of this
modification is that the request may contain two predicates
that refer to the same attribute. For example:
PartNumber <= 2000 /*original request from the user*/
PartNumber <= 1000 /*predicate from the user-profile*/
In this example the user requested to see a
PartNumber less than or equal to 2 000. The query is
appended with the user-profile predicate for this attribute,
PartNumber <= 1000, meaning that DBA has specified that this
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user is authorized to access only PartNumbers less than or
equal to 1000. It can be seen that the intersection of
these two predicates results in an authorized level of
request/access, i.e., PartNumber <= 1000. This intersection
process does not take place in the Query Mod mechanism, but
is handled later just before the access takes place. In
other words, the Query Mod mechanism only modifies a user
request by appendinq predicates. The modified request which
effects the intersection process will be executed by our new
access control mechanism (which is discussed in the sequel)
.
b. A Detailed Discussion
The Query Mod alqorithm for a non-insert type of
requests is as follows:
1. This step is similar to the first step of the Query
Mod alqorithm for an insert request; the template name
in the request (Reqtbl[8]) is compared to the user
profile's template (file) name.
2. The user profile is then checked to see if the desired
operation type (retrieve, retrieve-common, update,
delete) is authorized for the template.
3. The next step is to verify that the security attribute
has been included in the request (Reqtbl [9 ] , [ 10]
,
[11]), and that it is also in the user profile. If
the security attribute is not found in the request,
the user profile security level is inserted into the
request. If the security attribute is not found in
the user profile, insert the lowest level of security
(0) into the request.
4. The next step is to verify that the requested security
level is within the security level specified in the
user profile. The user profile allows DBA to specify
different accesses for different security levels based
on the request type (insert, delete, etc.). If the
requested security level is out of ranqe, the security
level in the request (Reqtbl [12]) is overwritten with
the security level specified in the user profile.
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5. The final step is to modify the query predicate list
with predicates from the user profile. As shown in
Figure 3.1, the user profile contains the access
control information for each attribute of a given
database. This access control information is in the
form of predicates and are related to each attribute
based on operation, i.e., retrieve, insert, etc. The
operation selected is based on the query. These
predicates, which articulate access control for a
given operation, are appended onto the predicate list.
The result is a query now modified with the
desired access control. Every user query will be modified
by this method, which is totally transparent to the user.
As a result of this modification the predicate list has more
predicates which therefore better articulate or define the
clusters that will answer a query. Because the modified
query is better able to define the desired clusters, fewer
clusters and therefore fewer records are retrieved. The
savings, as a result, are significant because of the
inherent slowness of data retrieval from the secondary
storage.
C. AN EXAMPLE OF QUERY MODIFICATION
The following example is provided to further illustrate
the Query Mod mechanism.
1 . A Sample User Profile
Figure 3.6 is provided in support of the example.
Reading the example in Figure 3.6 from the top to the
bottom, we note that this user's name is Smith, his/her ID
number is 9999, and his/her password is secretpassword.

















RETRIEUE CRSMUM 2 CS999 CRSNUM 4 CSOOO
INSERT CRSNUM 2 CS999 CRSNUM 4 CSOOO
UPDATE CRSNUM 2 CS999 CRSNUM 4 CSOOO
DELETE
ROOM
RETRIEUE ROOM 4 OOO
INSERT ROOM 4 000
























Figure 3.6 Sample User Profile
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help describe this user's profile, some of the authorized
options for Smith based on this profile are provided. For
example, there are two templates (therefore, two files) in
the database SCHOOL to which Smith can access: Course and
Student. For the records of Course, Smith is authorized
with retrievals, insertions, updates, but not deletions.
Smith is restricted to retrieving only up to secret
information; and inserting and updating confidential
information. Further, restrictions are dictated regarding
the attributes in template Course. For example, Smith has
the access to records of Computer Sciences classes CSOOO to
CS999 but no others. Here, numbers are used to represent
relational operators: 1 <; 2 <=; 3 >; 4 >=; 5 =; 6 ! = .
Therefore, Smith is authorized to retrieve those values
greater than or egual to zero for the attribute GPA that are
unclassified. The attribute GPA is in the template Student
which is in the database SCHOOL.
2 . An Example of a Request
The following is an example query that is originated
by the user Smith whose profile has been provided in the
previous figure.




This request is of the retrieve type, the retrieval
will be made from template Course; and the security level of
the information requested is less than or equal to top-
secret. The actual query is for all Course information that
is top-secret or below with course numbers (CRSNUM) less
than or equal to CS1200. The information desired is the
CRSNUM and ROOM values that satisfy this request.
Comparison of Smith's request against Smith's
profile cause several items to note. First, Smith is
authorized to retrieve secret or below information, the
query is requesting top-secret and below. Thus, the request
is out of range of the security attribute values. Also note
that Smith is requesting to see all CRSNUM 's and ROOM'S that
meet the requirements of the predicates; however, Smith is
limited to see only Computer Science (CS) courses from CSOOO
to CS999. The following section demonstrates how the Query
Mod mechanism handles these restrictions. Figure 3.7
illustrates how ABDL query appears as in its Reqtbl form.
3 . The Query Modification Algorithm
At this point in the algorithm, it assumed that
Smith has already logged on, and requested to use the
database, School. This means that the access to this
database has been verified, and that the user profile has
been read into its linked-list form.
The next step in the algorithm is then to determine
whether the requested operations on the template, Course
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ReqtbllO] = [
Reqtblll] = 9999 /* traffic ID number V
Reqtbl(2] = 1 /* request number */
Reqtbl[3l = 1 /* route type */
Reqtbll4] = 4 /* request type retrieve = 4 */
Reqtblll = 3 /* number of predicates */
Reqtbl{6] = TEMP /* required */
Reqtbll7] = 5 f* relational operator 5 =
'=' V
Reqtbllal = Course /* template name */
Reqtbll9l = SECURITY /* required V
Reqtblll 01-
2
/* relational operator 2 = '<=" */
Reqtblll 1]= 3 /* security level 3 = top secret */
Reqtbll 12]= CRSNUM /* predicate attribute name */
Reqtblll 31= 2 /* relational operator 2 =
'<=' */
Reqtbll 14]= CS 1200 /* predicate value */
Reqtblll5M /* marks end of predicates */
Reqtbll 161= * /* beginning of target list */
Reqtbll 1 7]= CRSNUM /* attribute name */
Reqtbll 16]= ROOM /* attribute name */
Reqtbll 19)=* /* end of target list */
Reqtbll20]= ] /* marks end of request */
Figure 3.7 ABDL Query in Reqtbl Form
(Reqtbl [8 ] ) , are authorized. This is done by finding the
matching template name in the user profile. Because this is
a retrieve-type request, permissions for retrieve operations
on this template must be granted in the user profile. In
this case, the retrieve operation is authorized.
The next step is to determine that security
attributes are indeed included in both the user query and
the user profile. Both of these do exist in our example,
and it is determined that Smith is authorized to retrieve up
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to and including secret information. However, the query is
requesting information less than or equal to top-secret.
Query Mod handles this by replacing the security value in
the request (Reqtbl [ 11] ) , i.e., 3 for top-secret, with the
security value in the user profile, i.e., 2 for secret.
At this point in the algorithm the predicate list
has been reached. Therefore, all of the predicates in the
user profile for each attribute that relate to the retrieve
operation are appended onto the predicate list.
Specifically, the template upon which the query is being
made has two attributes, CRSNUM and ROOM. Because this is a
retrieve-type request, only the predicates that relate to
the retrieve operation are selected. The predicates
selected for CRSNUM are CRSNUM 2 CS999 and CRSNUM 4 CSOOO.
The predicate selected for ROOM is ROOM 4 000. These three
predicates are appended onto the predicate list. The result
is a different query than whathas been started with. This
newly modified query is shown in Figure 3.8. As can be seen
in Figure 3.8, the query has been updated with a new
security value, and with three new predicates as a result of
Query Mod. This new query can now retrieve data that is















Reqtblll I! = 2
Reqtblll 2 = CRSNUM
Reqtblll 3 = 2
Reqtblll 4 = CS1200
Reqtblll 2 = CRSNUM
Reqtblll 3 = 2
Reqtblll 4! = CS999
Reqtblll 5 = CRSNUM
Reqtbl{16 = 2
Reqtblll? = CS999
Reqtblll 6 = ROOM
Reqtblll9 = 4
Reqtbll20 = OOO





/*updated security level value */
/^original predicate list item */
/inserted from the user profile*/
/inserted from trie user profile*/
/inserted from the user profile*/




Chapter II introduced the notion of attribute value
pairs, and how these are used via three meta data tables
(AT, DDIT, CDT) clusters are formed. Because of the nature of
these clusters an access precision of one was achieved.
Chapter III used the idea of attribute value pairs to show
how access control could be specified down to the attribute
level for each user. Chapter III also introduced a security
attribute value pair, thereby introducing the notion of
multilevel security. Multilevel security is concerned with
the application and implementation of providing access
control based on these security levels. This chapter will
discuss how multilevel security, using this security
attribute, is implemented into the database system as
described in Chapters II and III.
B. HIGH LEVEL DESCRIPTION OF MULTILEVEL SECURITY
1 . High Level Description
As stated in the previous section, Chapter II
introduced three meta data tables, AT, DDIT, and CDT.
Multilevel security, as suggested by Hoppenstand, is
implemented by using these tables, and using security as an
attribute value pair, with the attribute name being
"SECURITY," and the corresponding values being security
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levels as specified by application. This security attribute
however is not generally treated the same as other
attributes. These differences will shown in the remainder
of this chapter.
The first difference in the way the security
attribute is handled is that it is not introduced in either
AT or DDIT. The reason for this is that references to
security attributes should be kept to a minimum. Using this
reasoning, there is no need to introduce the security
attribute until CDT. It is in this table that the security
attribute is first used. The following Figure 4.1 is based
on Figure 2.1. Figure 4.1 shows the result of introducing
multilevel security. More specifically it shows the
introduction of security attribute value pairs. For this
example, four levels of security are presupposed: Unclassi-
fied (U) , Confidential (C) , Secret (S) , and Top Secret (TS)
.
Notice that Figure 4.1 is partitioned into four
parts, more specifically four CDT's, based on security
levels. The reason for this will be discussed. Notice that
Figure 4.1 shows that four clusters, CI, C6, Cll and C16,
are defined by the same Descriptor Id Sets, { Dll , D21, D31 }
,
if the security attributes for each are excluded. There-
fore, the security attributes are necessary to appropriately
cluster the corresponding records. As suggested in
Hoppenstand, all records must be defined in terms of a
security attribute. To illustrate this, consider the
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Id Desc-ld Set Record-Id





Id Desc-ld Set Record-Id





Id Desc-ld Set Record-Id
CI 1 {D 1 1 ,D21,D31,C} R3
C12 {D11 ,D21,D32,C} R5
C13 {D12,D21,D32,C} R10,R1 1
C14 {D13,D22,D31, C} R13
C15 {D14,D21,D32,C} R19
Id Desc-ld Set Record-Id
C16 {D 1 1 ,D21,D31,U} R4






Figure 4.1 Multiple CDTs as a Result of
Multilevel Security Introduction
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following example. Suppose a record was allowed to be
inserted without a security attribute. The result would be
similar masking off the security attribute mentioned
previously: the record could potentially be defined over
four different security levels, and therefore could be
defined as being simultaneously contained in four clusters.
As a result, the clusters would no longer define disjoint
sets of records, and therefore not support the mathematical
notion of equivalence classes upon which ABDL is based.
Therefore each record must be defined in terms of a security
attribute.
2 . Multiple CDTs
It has been shown to this point that the security
attribute must be included in all cluster definitions. If
four security levels were used, i.e., Unclassified, Confi-
dential, Secret, and Top Secret, the result would be to
potentially increase the size of the Cluster Definition
Table (CDT) by a factor of four. This is because each
cluster could be further defined by each classification
level, in this case, four levels. This increase in size is
a worst case scenario. If no records of a given
classification exist for a particular cluster definition,
then no cluster definition will be formed for it.
Regardless of this particular occurrence, the size of CDT is
greatly increased. The characteristics of this new form of
CDT presents two problems.
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The first problem is simply that because of its
increased size, the time necessary to find the appropriate
clusters based on Descriptor-Id Sets is increased as well.
The second problem is that the Pass Through problem,
discussed in Chapter I, has only been one step removed.
This is because even though the potential of searching
through base data for which a user may not be cleared for
has been avoided, the meta data, i.e., CDT, which refers to
data for which a user may not be cleared for, is brought
into memory and searched. Though this does not cause a pass
through problem, a more secure method that would only search
those CDTs that refers to data cleared for a user would be
preferable.
A solution to both of the above posed problems is to
partition this single large CDT into separate CDTs based on
security level. The result is Figure 4.1, which
demonstrates distinct CDTs that contain the meta data that
refers to data of only one security level.
The result of these multiple CDTs is twofold. The
first is that the amount of meta data that needs to be
searched is potentially reduced by a factor of the number of
security levels. This is a potential savings that depends
on the query and security level. If a query requests only
data of a particular security level, then the maximum gain
in efficiency is realized because only one CDT will be
searched as a result. However, a more likely query will
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request data that will cover a range of security levels.
This is due to the fact that a user is authorized access to
data at his/her security level and below. Therefore, the
amount of savings from multilevel security is determined by
the security level itself. For example, if the security
level is the highest level (i.e., Top Secret), then the
savings is minimal because all CDTs will need to be
searched. However, if the security level is the lowest
level, then the maximum savings in terms of efficiency is
obtained because only one CDT will be searched. The average
savings over time would be a 50% increase in efficiency.
This is so because assuming that data of each security level
has equal likelihood of being requested, then on the average
only half of CDTs will be searched as a result.
The second result of creating multiple CDTs based on
security level is a more secure solution to the pass-through
problem. The pass-through problem is solved in a more
secure fashion because as a result of multiple CDTs, not
only is the base data not authorized for a user not
searched, the meta data that references this unauthorized
base data is also not searched. Multiple CDTs makes this
possible because only those CDTs with the security level
authorized for a given request are actually searched in
memory.
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C. A DETAILED DESCRIPTION OF MULTIPLE CDTS
This section will describe in greater detail how
multiple CDTs are utilized in response to a query. This
description will follow a query after it has been through
the Query Mod process.
In Chapter III the notion of a request table (Reqtbl)
was introduced, and was defined as an array that largely
contained attribute value pairs that constituted a query.
This request table went through the Query Mod process
described in Chapter III. AT and DDIT tables are then
utilized to construct Descriptor-Id Sets, introduced in
Chapter II, which in turn are used to find the clusters and
ultimately to access record addresses of base data that
responds to the query. This process will not be discussed
in detail, but will only be explained as far as necessary to
explain the lower- level details of multilevel security.
The request table is passed to each of the backends in a
data structure called a traffic unit. The name of the
database on which the queries will be made is included in
this traffic unit. The name of the database is provided by
the user, and it is verified that the user has access to
this database during Query Mod. When each of the backends
receive this traffic unit, the database name is used to
initiate the construction in the memory of the meta data
that will describe this database names base data. What is
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constructed is a detailed description of AT, DDIT and
multiple CDT tables.
The implementation enforces multilevel security
utilizing multiple CDTs in the following fashion. Figure
4.2 shows the general notion of the implementation.
Each rectangle in Figure 4.2 represents CDT, and each is
identified with its respective security level. As shown,
there exists individual pointers for each security level.
In this example, there are four pointers, one for each of
Unclassified, Confidential, Secret, and Top Secret. Only
one of these pointers will be referenced in response to a
query. The security clearance level of the user, or the
security level specified in the query, is the deciding
factor for which pointer is to be utilized. As stated in
Chapter III, if the user does not specify a security level
in his/her query, the default is the lowest security
clearance level. If the user included a security level in
his/her query, and that specified security level is less
than or equal to that users security clearance level, then
it is that security level which decides which pointer is
utilized.
Figure 4.3 shows the simplified data structure of a
traffic unit with out multilevel security. The traffic unit
contains a pointer to meta data (CDT) that describes the
























Figure 4.3 Traffic Unit Data Structure
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the traffic unit is the request table (reqtbl) which
contains the query itself.
The meta data in this traffic unit consists of a sinqly
linked list of clusters that constitute CDT. When a search
of the clusters is made in response to the query, the list
is entered at the first cluster, CI. The search then
continues down th list following the pointers from cluster
to cluster, until the end of the list is encountered.
Multilevel security is implemented by modifying the meta
data pointer. Figure 4.4 shows a lower level view of the
result of this modification. The single meta data pointer
is replaced by an array of pointers. This number of
pointers in the array is equal to the number of security
levels in the database. In this example, there are four
security levels. Therefore, each pointer in the array
represents a security level.
Notice how Figure 4.4 models Figure 4.2. The linked
list of clusters is entered based on security level.
Because the list is singly linked, a CDT search entering at
a given security level can not move up the list. That is, a
cluster search is forced to search at the security level at
which it was entered, and those clusters of lower security
levels. For example, a query entering with a Confidential
security level can only search clusters at the Confidential
and Unclassified levels. The clusters at the Top Secret and




















Figure 4.4 Multilevel Security Traffic Unit Data Structure
clusters at the Confidential and Unclassified security
levels are found in response to the query, the record
addresses corresponding to these clusters are returned, and
these records will ultimately be retrieved. Note that this
implementation directly supports the notion of multilevel
security in that access is granted only at the specified
security level and below.
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V. CONCLUSIONS
A. SUMMARY OF CONTRIBUTION
This thesis has shown for the first time, a frontend
(Query Mod) and backend (Multilevel Security) approach to
database security, implemented into a single database
system. Hoppenstand ' s proposal on the structures of
multilevel secure databases was incorporated into the
experimental database management system, the Multi-Backend,
Multi-Lingual, Multi-Model Database System. An access
control mechanism for DBMS, derived from the Query
Modification research of D.K. Hsiao, M. Stonebraker, and E.
Wong was designed and implemented to regulate and verify
access to the multilevel secure database generated from
Hoppenstand • s proposal.
The frontend (Query Mod) mechanism provides a high
degree of access control down to the attribute level. The
backend (Multilevel Security) mechanism provides for data
access in such a way as to eliminate the pass-through
problem. Both of these mechanisms function together to
provide an absolute access precision. The result is a
highly secure and highly efficient database system.
Security mechanisms on contemporary database machines
typically inhibit system performance. The Query Mod and
Multilevel Security mechanisms, however, enhance system
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performance while simultaneously providing a higher degree
of security.
B. REMAINING ISSUES AND FUTURE WORK
Two areas of work may follow: (1) a formal proof that
Hoppenstand 1 s proposal is secure and then a formal proof
that the implementation of Hoppenstand • s proposal is secure;
and (2) benchmarking of system efficiency after multilevel
security and access control implementation for comparison
with [Ref. 9] to determine the degree of system efficiency
improvement. Because there is an infinite number of
possible database security test runs, a formal proof is the
only way to completely prove a secure system and therefore
formally show the elegance of the multilevel security
proposal. The benchmarking of the system will serve to
experimentally solidify the expected system performance
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